Amartya Sen illustrates why the approach of transcendental institutions is struggling in a globalised world and how comparative methods are better able to improve our world.

In his recent book ‘The Idea of Justice’, Amartya Sen, a Nobel-Prize winner and professor of philosophy and economics at Harvard University, seeks ways to decrease injustice rather than to find the perfect model of justice. The publication starts with a juxtaposition of the concepts of transcendental institutions and realization-focused comparison. Former, which has been advocated by Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, has two main problems, according to Mr. Sen. Firstly, he criticizes the feasibility of the theory since there exists no absolute set of institutions. Institutions in this sense refer to social establishments that promote and possibly enforce justice in society. Secondly, institutions are neither sufficient nor necessary for achieving social justice thus being redundant.

The concept of realization-focused comparison, on the other hand, is much endorsed by Mr. Sen. Partly developed by Adam Smith and Karl Marx this theory concentrates on ‘real’ solutions advocating justice by comparing existing institutions rather than finding ideal yet hypothetical ones. An existing institution is preferred if it promotes the freedom of individuals within society, thereby leading to an increased individual’s opportunity to seek wealth as well as an intensified accountability of one’s own actions.

Consequently, Mr. Sen does not seek for the ultimate ideal of justice but explores how to decrease injustice by selecting superior institutions. He confronts two ways of arriving at the destination of improved justice. A comprehensive outcome is reached by including the deontological processes, i.e. the examination of the acts leading to the outcome. A culmination outcome, in contrast, is attained by considering the actual consequences caused by people’s actions. This second approach seems to be closer to reality since the actual impacts on people’s lives are taken into consideration.

The first chapter examines the causality of ‘doing good’ to ‘being well’. Mr. Sen refers to Akbar, an ancient Indian emperor, whose priority was the ‘pursuit of reason’ that eventually leads to ‘doing good’. Human reflection in general, however, consists not only of reasoning but also of emotions. These two sides are intertwined and interact with each other. David Hume, for example, proclaimed that emotions dominate the human mind. Smith, on the contrary, argues that reasoning can influence and change emotions.

In order to arrive at objective reasoning persons need to be open-minded and welcome information. Mr. Sen points to ‘reasoned scrutiny’, i.e. the exact examination of thought and perception, which eventually leads to justice through impartiality. Being critical can prevent harm; only goodwill cannot. Emotions should therefore not be applied unconditionally. Yet, without goodwill a person is unlikely to intend to prevent harm, even if he or she possesses the ability, i.e. the reasoning capability, to do so. Goodwill is, consequently, necessary but not sufficient to act justly.

In the second chapter Mr. Sen disputes the political theory developed by John Rawls, a leading figure of political philosophy in the twentieth century[1]. A major point of Rawls is that fairness leads to justice. Fairness is associated with persons while justice is linked to institutions. In order to arrive at the state of fairness, social bias and vested interests need to be abated. Rawls model include three stages of which each stage builds on the previous one.

A so-called ‘original position’ forms the basis of justice. At this point the vested interests of all parties are unknown even to themselves. The original position marks the point where the perceptions of justice of all parties are in line without the need to bargain. Nevertheless, Mr. Sen argues that plurality may exist in the original position, thereby making the arrival at one original point impossible. In the second stage institutions are developed based on the values found previously. Social decisions, e.g. legislation, are finally formed in the third stage.

Furthermore, Rawls’ theory consists of two basic principles. The first principle states that, in order to be just, liberty needs to be maximized for all parties, liberty needs to be similar for all parties, and liberty needs to be given priority over other issues at all times. Rawls insists in the second principle on equal opportunities for all parties as well as equity in distribution and efficiency. Obviously there is a trade-off between maximization of welfare for the whole society and equal distribution. Rawls, for instance, accepts ‘incentives’ (i.e. bribes) if they contribute to an increase in efficiency and equity. The allowance for incentives, however, might hamper opportunities of other parties who cannot afford paying bribes.

The chapter also mentions seven points endorsing Rawls’ theory. Firstly, the fact that fairness is central to justice, thus including elements of personal actions; secondly, the imperative of objective reasoning in order to arrive at justice; thirdly, the distinction between rational, i.e. having a functioning mind, and reasonable, i.e. thinking intelligently; fourthly, the priority of liberty, although Mr. Sen later finds this priority to be too extreme; fifthly, the importance of processes of how to arrive at justice and not merely focus on outcomes; sixthly, the allowance for competition, and lastly, the permission for people to do what they like.

Yet, Mr. Sen emphasizes three major weaknesses of the political theory developed by Rawls. He argues that Rawls merely concentrates on institutions rather than on actual happenings. Mr. Sen refers to the concepts of ‘niti’ and ‘nyaya’, two Sanskrit words both meaning justice. Whereas the former term stands for “organizational property and behavioural correctness”[2], the latter is “a comprehensive concept of realized justice”², which not only focuses on the role of institutions but also on the actual outcomes in the real world. According to the concept of nyaya, not only institutions should be considered but also their impact on people and whether these institutions can actually change the behavior of persons. Although Rawls’ first principle assures the choice of the right institutions and the second principle induces appropriate behavior, reality is too complex that simple rules about freedom and equal opportunities can lead to justice.

Another criticism on Rawls’ theory is the uncertainty and incompleteness prevailing at the original position. The social contract implied at that point might be hard to realize or even might not be achieved at all since no singular agreement among all parties can be found. Mr. Sen rather endorses Smith’s idea of the ‘impartial spectator’, the objective observation of our own actions, which eventually leads to an enhanced consciousness. Taking the idea of Rawls’ social contract to a worldwide scale, a ‘gigantic global social contract’ would be necessary at the original position. Such a contract presumes the existence of a world government; local events and local parochial beliefs, however, immensely complicate such a political system.

In the third chapter, Mr. Sen compares the leadership styles of Ashoka, a former Indian emperor, and Kautilya, the political adviser to Ashoka’s father. While Ashoka abandoned most institutions and heavily relied on behavioral reform, Kautilya’s economy was founded on institutions promoting appropriate behavior and punishing citizens if necessary. The fact that Ashoka’s empire fell apart soon after his death points the reader to the direction Mr. Sen is heading.

He emphasizes the need to seek for institutions that promote justice. Yet, he warns about falling into the trap of institutional fundamentalism, which allows only for just institutions. David Gauthier, for example, envisions a market-like method to pinpoint institutions. He claims that after finding the right institutions, people can be free from morality, since institutions will restrict their behavior in such a way that they are in line with justice. Yet, as Mr. Sen stresses, reality needs to be assessed constantly. Three political theories are, according to Mr. Sen, on the right track: utilitarianism, the social choice theory, and the normative approaches developed by Adam Smith.

Throughout the book, which consists of a myriad of short, well-written essays grouped into chapters, Mr. Sen expresses a sound logic complemented with pieces of dry humor. At the end of chapter two, for example, he discloses the difference between the Latin words ‘justitia’, justness, and ‘justitium’, a court vacation, remarking that we “need to move on, rather than taking a ‘vacation’”[3]. By including Eastern leaders and philosophers Mr. Sen’s intention to “create justice in a globalised world”[4] immensely gains in credibility. The novel distinction between two competing philosophical models about justice favors the comparative approach, which might actually advance the real world. The book therefore gains a positive tone and is able to satisfy the reader most of the times. In a nutshell, ‘The Idea of Justice’ is a sensational read and is highly recommended to everybody seeking to broaden his mind.

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[1] Audi, R. (1999). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[2] [3] Sen, A. (2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge: The Belknap Press.

[4] The Economist. (6. August 2009). How to do it better. The Economist .